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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-F1FTH AMENDMENT DuE PRoCEss-VAGUE AND

TRIAL ON QUESTION OF ILLEGAL PRESENCE IN
UNITED STATES-Defendant, an alien, against whom an order of deportation
had been entered in 1930 by reason of his advocacy of the overthrow of the
government by force and violence, was indicted for violation of section 20(c)
of the Immigration Act of 1917 as amended,1 which made it a felony for an
alien against whom such an order is outstanding to "willfully fail or refuse to
make timely application in good faith for travel or other documents necessary
to his departure." The lower court dismissed the indictment on the ground
that the statute in question was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite for
failure to specify the nature of the travel documents necessary for departure and
for failure to indicate to which country or to how many countries the alien
INDEFINITE STATUTE-RIGHT TO

1 Section 23 of the Internal Security Act of 1950, 64 Stat. L. 1010, 8 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV, 1951) §l56(c).
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should make application. On appeal, held, reversed. The statute on its face
meets the constitutional test of certainty and definiteness. The court will not
decide whether the statute is unconstitutional on the ground that it afforded
defendant no opportunity to have the court which tried him pass on the validity
of his deportation order because the defendant did not raise, brief or argue that
question. United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169, 73 S.Ct. 591 (1952).
That a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates an essential element of Fifth Amendment due process of law, is an established tenet. 2 Commonly subsumed under
the "vague and indefinite" heading it is a fundamental ground used in attacks
on the constitutionality of criminal statutes. 3 The term "vague and indefinite"
being in itself vague and indefinite and open to subjective interpretation, the
Court has in various ways sought to specify its scope. A criminal statute must
have an ascertainable standard of guilt,4 but it is not unconstitutional merely
because application of it may be uncertain in exceptional cases,5 or because it
is so framed as to require a jury on occasion to determine a question of reasonableness. 6 Such a statute may still provide a practical guide to permissible conduct. The essential purpose of the "void for vagueness" doctrine is to warn
individuals of the criminal consequences of their conduct.7 The court, however, will not require an impossible standard of certainty in statutes defining
crimes,8 and difficulty in determining whether certain marginal offenses are
within the meaning of the language under attack as vague does not render
a statute unconstitutionally indefinite.9 However, the required ascertainable
standard of guilt must be fixed by Congress rather than by the courts. 10 The
Court in the Spector case held the words "timely application" were referable to

2 Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 46 S.Ct. 126 (1925), annotated 70 L.Ed. 322; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 59 S.Ct. 618 (1939); Champlin
Ref. Co. v. Corporation Commission, 286 U.S. 210, 52 S.Ct. 559 (1931).
8 Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97, 71 S.Ct. 576 (1951); Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 65 S.Ct. 1031 (1945). But see Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223,
71 S.Ct. 703 (1951), where the Court examined a statute which did not declare certain
conduct criminal but apprised aliens of deportation consequences which follow after conviction of t\vo crimes for moral turpitude, because of the "grave nature of deportation."
However, the Court appeared to do this more as a matter of judicial grace than as allowing
the vagueness objection to a deportation statute the dignity of a due process objection.
4 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 68 S.Ct. 665 (1948); United States v. Cohen
Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 42 S.Ct. 183 (1921).
5 Hygrade Provision Co. v. Sherman, 266 U.S. 497, 45 S.Ct. 141 (1924).
6 United States v. Ragen, 314 U.S. 513, 62 S.Ct. 374 (1942).
7 Statutes held void for uncertainty and indefiniteness: Lanzetta v. New Jersey, supra
note 2; Connally v. General Construction Co., supra note 2; Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16
App. D.C. 229, 48 L.R.A. 220 (1900).
s United States v. Petrillo, 332 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 1538 (1947).
o United States v. Wurzbach, 280' U.S. 396, 50 S.Ct. 167 (1930).
10 Screws v. United States, supra note 3; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., supra
note 4. Close construction of an act, however, may save it from a vagueness that is fatal,
Screws v. United States, supra.
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a prior-mentioned six-month period and were sufficiently definite. 11 As against
the dissent's observation that aliens are not necessarily sophisticated world travelers with a knowledge of which documents are necessary for departure from
one country and entrance into another, the Court held that any possible statutory trap for the uninitiate in present-day governmental red tape is obviated
by emphasizing the statute's reference to "good faith application." In reference
to the latter one may wonder, as did the dissent by inference, whether a statute
can be saved from an attack as vague by emphasis on another phrase equally
vague and even more subjective. However, it is submitted, that if "reasonable"
is an unobjectionable standard, "good faith" should also qualify.
The ground most vigorously urged by the dissent for the unconstitutionality
of this section of the act was not vagueness. The dissenters assert that the
fact that an alien could be imprisoned up to ten years for violation of a deportation order without a trial on the legality of his presence in the United States
( which underlay that order) violated Fifth Amendment due process. That aliens
as well as citizens are entitled to protection of the Fifth Amendment as regards
procedure in a criminal trial is clear. 12 This right does not extend to deportation proceedings13 which Congress may entrust to executive officers with no provision for a judicial hearing on the grounds for deportation.14 However, if
infamous punishment such as imprisonment is to be added to deportation, Fifth
Amendment due process is applicable and all safeguards of a criminal trial must
be adhered to.15 The Spector case falls between the above holdings in that
punishment is not for illegal presence in the United States per se but for failure
to comply with a deportation order. However, the basis of that deportation
order is illegal presence in the United States. The dissent felt that illegal pres-

11 Section 20(c) of the act provides that any alien against whom a specified order of
deportation is outstanding "who shall willfully fail or refuse to depart from the United
States within a period of six months from the date of such order of deportation, or from
September 23, 1950 [date of the enactment of the Subversive Activities Control Act],
whichever is the later, or shall willfully fail or refuse to make timely application in good
faith for travel or other documents necessary to his departure . . . shall upon conviction be
guilty of a felony, and shall be imprisoned not more than ten years...."
12 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 16 S.Ct. 977 (1895); at least as to
friendly aliens if not alien enemies, Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S.
481, 51 S.Ct. 229 (1930). Extensive annotation as to constitutional rights of aliens in the
United States, 68 L.Ed. 262 et seq. (1923); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 62 S.Ct.
552 (1941).
1a Li Sing v. United States, 180 U.S. 486, 21 S.Ct. 449 (1900); Chin Yow v. United
States, 208 U.S. 8, 28 S.Ct. 201 (1908); but if person substantiates a claim to citizenship
by probative evidence sufficient to establish the fact, he is entitled to a judicial hearing,
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 42 S.Ct. 492 (1922).
14 A limit to the power entrusted to an executive officer in these deportation proceedings is that there is a denial of due process if the alien is deported without a hearing or on
charges unsupported by any evidence. United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. Comm. of Immigration, 273 U.S. 103, 47 S.Ct. 302 (1926); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263
U.S. 149, 44 S.Ct. 54 (1923); annotation 16 Ann. Cas. 1069.
15 Wong Wing v. United States, supra note 12; United States v. Wong Dep Ken,
(D.C. Cal. 1893) 57 F. 206.
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ence was. the crucial element of the crime and it necessitated a judicial hearing
to be consonant with prior adjudications as to due process requi)'.ements.16
Severance of the question of illegal presence from the question of non-compliance with a deportation order was regarded as a subversion of prior holdings.
The majority, while not rejecting the dissenting view, refused to consider it on
the ground that the Court will not decide important constitutional questions
which the parties have not presented, briefed or argued.17

Marcus A. Rowden, S.Ed..

Note 15 supra.
v. Wiener, 321 U.S. 253, 64 S.Ct. 548 (1944). If, as the dissenters
suggested, reargument should have been ordered and the issue raised as to unconstitutionality on the latter issue, a divided court might have resulted, upholding the lower court's
· determination. Of the eight justices who sat on the case, three specifically agreed on the
latter point, and the dissenting opinion implies that if the point were properly raised they
(the dissent) might be joined by the writer of the majority opinion.
16

17 Flournoy

